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Abstract
This paper examines the emotional and social motivations of belief and belief correction. As beliefs 
motivate one’s actions, one must examine how one revises an erroneous or harmful belief and what 
methodology one can employ in order to best facilitate this revision, resulting in more conscientious 
action. This paper examines belief formation and revision in the context of David Hume’s 1739-1740 
work A Treatise of Human Nature, with particular attention to not only Hume’s account of belief and 
belief revision, but also the interaction of passions, the mechanism of sympathy, reason, and probability 
judgments. It is hypothesized Hume’s theory of belief will be reflected in contemporary psychology and 
cognitive science, with individuals more likely to revise their beliefs based emotional and social factors 
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Introduction
David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature maintains a uniquely prescient outlook in 
philosophy, as well as contemporary cognitive research. As Hume recognized, not 
only the relationship between philosophy and science, but that science can be used 
to examine human nature,1 he set his sights on uncovering the science of the mind, 
posited as discoverable using a framework established by the sciences of the time: 
observation and experimentation. We must first understand the mind in order to un-
derstand other sciences, as the mind is the foundation upon which all other sciences 
rest.2 Hume hypothesized that this new science of the mind is deciphered through 
“cautious observation of human life,” best conducted in their natural environments 
as they occur, and in all manner of states.3 
Considering Hume’s empirical framework and dedication to uncovering the natural 
operations of the mind, he may well have been one of the first psychologists in the 
contemporary sense of the word, fitting cognitive research into his philosophical ob-
jectives rather neatly. It is my intention to assess Hume’s account of belief and to 
further analyze the contributions the Treatise may have granted contemporary psy-
chology. In order to explore the subject, it becomes imperative to examine Hume’s 
account of belief, probability, passions, and the mechanism of sympathy. I therefore 
aim to establish Hume’s outlined theory will be reflected in contemporary research, 
with individuals being more likely to revise beliefs based on emotions, as proposed 
by Hume.  
Hume’s Treatise Examined
Belief & Probability
Belief, defined by Hume, is any opinion or recollection that is “a lively idea related 
with a present impression”.4 This proposes that beliefs are informed by conceptions 
of past experiences captured with sensory, cognitive, and passionate faculties. An 
1  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), T Intro. 4; SBN x.
2  T Intro.7; SBN xvi-xvii.
3  T Intro. 10; SBN xviii-xix.
For instance observing others in their pleasures.
4  T 1.3.7.5; SBN 96.
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idea is a fainter copy of the original impression; these copies bear the same passion-
ate and recollected sensory function as the original, but are less forceful in strength 
and vivacity. They exist in the imagination and memory as a repository from which 
to draw.5 We must first experience impressions to form ideas that lead to judgments 
and beliefs; it follows that when we make a causal judgment, we are merely assess-
ing based on information gathered from past impressions. This process begins with 
our initial impressions and the perceived constant conjunction between cause and 
effect.6 Repeated experiences result in a custom of belief7 which primes our expecta-
tions and future judgments.8 Memories of impressions are then re-enlivened by simi-
lar impressions through factors of likeness: contiguity, resemblance, and proximity. 
With this, we assume that what we experience in the past will be similar to those of 
our future. Beliefs, opinions, and expectations of causality are therefore the result of 
repeated experiences.9 
It is important to note the weight placed on the feeling involved with belief. Belief is 
not simply an exercise in imagination. Our minds can entertain many things—some-
thing he calls a reverie10—but it does not imply that all comprehended is believed.11 
To assent, there must be a lively idea related to a present impression.12 Hume is then 
asserting that belief is not predicated on reason, but on forceful and vivacious per-
ceptions13 which enliven passions and notions of pleasure and pain.14 This process 
is attended by memory and imagination.15 It follows then that a proper account of 
belief includes memory and the recollection of similar instances where the perceived 
cause occurs prior to the perceived effect, both exist contiguously in time with innu-
5  Seppalainen, Tom, and Angela Coventry. “Hume’s Empiricist Inner Epistemology: A Reassessment 
of the Copy Principle.” The Continuum Companion to Hume (2012): 38-56.
6  T 1.3.9.13; SBN 113-114.
7  Or habit of belief. 
8  T 1.3.13.19-20; SBN 153-5.
9  T 1.3.13.8; SBN 147.
10  T 1.4.7.12; SBN 270-1.
11  T 1.3.7.7, T App. 3; SBM 628-9, 624-4.
12  T 1.3.7.5; SBN 96.
13  T 1.3.13.19; SBN 153-4.
14  T 1.3.10.4; SBN 120.
15  This includes an impression of the passions and emotions experienced.
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merable instances of “cause” and “effect” paired, and when we experience variations 
in the anticipated cause or effect that run against experience, these differences are 
explainable by an unknown but discoverable variable.16 
With a standard of proper belief, it follows that there are erroneous beliefs—or unphi-
losophical probabilities.17 These are mistaken beliefs based on experiences with in-
sufficient information. These include generalizations formed from biases and preju-
dices. For example, the belief that the Irish are not witty18 could generalize from one 
unrepresentative encounter and then be promoted cognitively as a rule.19 Rather than 
“that Irishman lacked wit”, it is assumed that all Irishmen lack wit. This tendency to 
generalize can be illustrated further; Hume explains that when someone develops a 
liking for something—a certain fruit or type of wine—this tends to extend to similar 
things: from peaches to melons, white wine to red.20 It is a natural extension based on 
similarity. But experiences are not always representative of true nature,21 and Hume 
emphasizes the importance of reflecting on the context of experiences in order to be 
conscientious of ways we could have misinterpreted experiences.22 Upon reexamin-
ing an interaction deemed causal, there may be an unknown variable determining 
causality. The objects were then falsely paired by the imagination.23
As a spectator, we may witness an interaction and come to an incorrect conclusion.24 
16  T 1.3.9.2, 1.3.15.1-11; SBN 107, 173-5.
17  T 1.3.13.11-2; SBN 149-50.
18  T 1.3.13.7; SBN 146-7.
19  T 1.3.13.8; SBN 147.
20  T 1.3.13.8; SBN 147.
21  True nature of a person, experience, thing, etc. 
22  T 1.3.13.9; 3.1.1.15; SBN 147-8, 461.
This misinterpretation yields our judgement incorrect. 
23  T 1.3.13.9; SBN 147-8.
An example of such an illusory relationship could be the fear one may feel when standing too close 
to a precipice. Even if there is a guard rail, one’s imagination may still re-enliven the fear of falling, 
even when one is rationally aware they are safe
24  T 3.1.1.15; SBN 461.
Hume gives the example of himself being intimate with his neighbor’s wife; the incorrect conclusion 
is then that the woman is his wife and no adultery is taking place.
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The opportunity to misjudge extends further to circumstances due to internal states.25 
These can  sway the course of an interaction, making them unrepresentative.26 With 
this in mind, we are encouraged to consider contextual factors in situations where 
we find ourselves immediately reactive before forming judgments.27 Incorrect judg-
ments also affect emotions and subsequent actions,28 as we are willed to action by 
passions29 informed by perceptions of pleasure and pain.30 He observes that humans 
naturally gravitate to the pleasant,31 and those experiences compel emotional reac-
tions. Hume proposes that both painful and pleasant impressions are necessary in 
order to “produce an affection of any kind”.32 
Passions & Sympathy
These affections are a cornerstone of Hume’s Treatise. Our judgment and reason 
are experienced sensations,33 rendering them another internal feeling or emotional 
state. Hume justifies this in that reason alone can often be unconvincing. We may 
experience a desire that is illogical and the presentation of evidence indicating its 
absurdity may do little to dissuade us from our objective. Reason by itself does not 
prevail upon the mind in a thoroughly convincing way.34 We are, however, motivat-
ed by what we want.35 The often poorly understood assertion that “[r]eason is, and 
25  For example, if the person with whom an interaction took place is tired, ill, or if one simply has an 
active imagination.
26  Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: With a Letter from a Gentleman to 
his Friend in Edinburgh and Hume’s Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, Edited by Eric Steinberg 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 2.7, 8.14-15; SBN 20, 88-9; T 1.3.10.9; SBN 123.
27  T 3.1.1.12; SBN 459-60.
28  T 3.1.1.12; SBN 459-60.
29  T. 2.3.3.6-7; SBN 415-17.
30  T 2.1.1.1; 2.3.3.3; 2.3.9.1; SBN 275; 414; 438.
31  T 2.3.9.2; SBN 438.
32  T 2.3.9.1; SBN 438.
33  T 1.3.8.12; SBN 103.
Reason is then subsequently the result of an initial impression. 
34  T 2.3.3.2-8; SBN 413-17.
35  T 2.3.3.3; SBN 414.
The movement towards what is pleasure and the distancing from painful.
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ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office 
than to serve and obey them”36 summarizes it quite succinctly: we use reason to suit 
a purpose; rather than embattled in a rivalry, reason attends passion (as a calm pas-
sion itself) by determining the best course to achieve goals.
Passions must then be integrated into Hume’s previously laid argument for the tem-
poral precedence of impressions.37 Hume proposes a double relationship between 
ideas and impressions by which passions are derived.38 This can be understood as a 
psychological mechanism that integrates the separate processing faculties39 result-
ing in the perception of a seamless experience.40 This attention to self, as well as the 
dual relation of ideas and impressions as an integrated experience, is explained as a 
natural and protective mechanism.41
Sympathy is perhaps the most important mechanism within Hume’s theoretical 
framework. Once we have an experience and develop an understanding of what 
passions result from it, we are able to extend sympathy to others in similar circum-
stances.42 Using memory,43 we can infer the predicament of others, enlivening our 
own passions.44 While the extension of sympathy may occur more readily with those 
36  T 2.3.3.4; SBN 414-415.
Passions are then positioned as the motivation to action.
37  T 1.3.8.12-13; SBN 103-104.
Observation is apprehended by experiences and impressions and sensations. 
38  T 2.1.5.5; SBN 286-7.
39  Ideas and impressions.
40  When one surveys an impression, one recalls instances within their own memory and ideas that 
one has categorized as similar. Although impressions and their corresponding ideas (and subsequent 
memories) are retrieved separately, it occurs in such quick succession that it does not feel they are 
separate.
41  T 2.1.3.2; 2.2.3.6-7; SBN 280; 350.
Passions pertaining to one’s self stem from a concern for personal well-being that attends to survival.
42  Hume grants that these subjective perceptions and the ability to observe others facilitate the 
ability to understand and feel their emotional weight, with passions stirred by the plight of others. 
By the observation of impressions, one may gather what another person is feeling based on body 
language, expressions, and tone.
43  This is achieved through the double relation.
44  T 3.3.1.7; 3.3.2.6; SBN 575-6; 595-6.
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closest to us,45 it is possible to extend sympathy to strangers and even imagined per-
sons.46 Sympathy then allows the transference of passions through socializing.47 The 
understanding and transference of like passions is then a natural and unavoidable 
cognitive mechanism.48 With the foundation of impressions, memories, and sympa-
thetic reactions, it follows that new experiences may position one in a state of reflec-
tion.49 Emotionally compelling experiences therefore have a stronger likelihood of 
revising judgments,50 as beliefs are vested in passions, and sympathy plays a power-
ful role in communication with others.51 By tempering judgment and allowing new 
opportunities to extend sympathy to others, we open ourselves to revising a belief.52 
This is achieved through the combination of sympathetic passions and social en-
gagement.53
Contemporary Research
Belief, Probability, Emotions & Sympathy
The work of cognitive researchers appears increasingly sympathetic to the hypoth-
eses presented by Hume. The importance of passions (or emotion, in contemporary 
accounts) on information processing and the formation and correction of beliefs has 
found support. In order to examine the parallels between Hume’s work in the Trea-
45  T 3.3.1.14; 3.3.3.2; SBN 580-1; 602-3.
46  T 2.2.7.3; SBN 369-70.
This also includes the dead. 
47  T 2.2.7.5; 2.3.6.7-8; SBN 370-1; 426-7.
48  T 3.3.3.5; SBN 604-5.
49  T 3.1.1.15; SBN 461.
Specifically instances that run counter to previous experiences.
This reflection allows one to integrate new experiences and reappraise previous judgments in a new 
light. 
50  Which, in turn, adjusts the belief or judgment.
51  T 2.3.6.8; 3.2.2.9; SBN 427; 489.
It also follows that perspective taking, emotional appeals, and enlivening passions with situations 
that are not the common experiences emotionally compelling and sympathetically derived evidence 
to the contrary of previous conclusion
52  T 1.4.1.11; SBN 185-6.
53  T 2.1.11.7-8; 2.3.3.2; 2.3.6.7-8; 3.1.2.11; 3.2.2.9; SBN 318-20; 412-414; 426-7; 475-6; 489.
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tise and recent research, I will provide a contemporary account of the pivotal role of 
emotions in processing information, forming judgments, and actions. The role of so-
cial engagement and experience in breaking mental habits that contribute to biases, 
prejudices, and unphilosophical probabilities will also be examined. 
Tversky and Kahneman’s54 preeminent research exploring decision-making found 
that, when gauging the probabilities of certain outcomes, individuals frequently em-
ploy inherent heuristics based on prior experiences. These were found to be useful as 
categorization and decision making tools55 so the conflation of frequently paired im-
pression with rates of actual occurrence was common.56 They also found evidence for 
several cognitive “shortcuts”, like the availability heuristic wherein we rely on the il-
lusory correlation of things easily recalled or imagined, as well as the representative-
ness heuristic which relies on the supposition that past experiences are indicative of 
what will be experienced. The last “shortcut” proposed by Tversky and Kahneman is 
adjustment an anchoring: we hold an internal baseline or estimation regarding the 
judgment of a probability, and we adjust it as we see fit, often in an ineffective way. 
These heuristics can be understood as expressions of probability judgments within 
belief formation; we experience an impression or idea, and when confronted with 
a judgment or situation, draw from past impressions57 with varying degrees of suc-
cess.58 
Research findings using visual masking59 and awareness of perceptions further mo-
tivate Hume’s hypothesis that forceful and vivacious impressions re-enliven previ-
54  Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. “Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases.” 
Science 185, no. 4157 (1975): pp. 1124-1131.
55  They are utilized by the mind to make quick decisions and organize information.
56  For instance, one may be given information that an individual is quiet and studious, and when 
that individual is given the choice between three potential career paths for the quiet and studious 
person, rather than categorizing them as an engineer or a salesman, they may predict that the 
individual is most likely a librarian.
57  Memory.
58  T 1.3.9.17; 1.3.13.8; 1.3.13.20; SBN 116, 147; 154-5.
Success can be seen as depending upon the liveliness and strength of the present impression and 
the similarity and likeness of stimuli. 
59  Visual masking is when perception of a stimulus is affected by the presence of another stimulus, 
referred to as the “mask”.
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ous ones.60 It was concluded by researchers that in order for one to be aware or con-
scious of an impression or stimuli, that impression must have enough strength to be 
noticed.61 It was hypothesized that when experiencing an impression, memory calls 
upon held impressions; the new impression arouses prior with both force and vivac-
ity in order for it to be noticed, thus re-enlivening an idea or memory and bringing 
the previously unnoticed stimuli to attention.62 Based on factors of similarity,63 minor 
deviations from previous experiences are easily disregarded and integrated into pre-
dictive judgments and belief schemas.  
The importance of stimuli processing and the employment of memory in recognizing 
like experiences can also be seen in contemporary research concerning perceptions 
of and behaviors in reaction to climate change.64 When investigating the adaptability 
of behaviors and practices of private forest owners, it was determined that the be-
lief in local effects, as well as the belief in a personal experience of climate change, 
contributed to adaptive responses and the adoption of action steps. The strength 
of belief paired with perceptions of experienced local effects were strong factors in 
willingness to act. The significance placed on the strength of a belief as well as per-
sonal experiences lends further credence to the role that strength and vivacity of an 
impression play in making a judgment, forming a belief, and the propensity towards 
action.65 
Similar results expressing the importance of the strength and vivacity of impressions 
in re-enlivening past impressions and making judgments was mirrored in research 
regarding the believability of claims.66 Participants rated studies containing brain im-
60  Sid Kouider and Stanislas Dehaene. “Levels of processing during non-conscious perception: 
a critical review of visual masking.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: 
Biological Sciences 362, no. 1481 (2007): 857-875.
61  T 1.3.8.2; 1.3.9.11; 1.4.2.41; SBN 98-9; 112; 208.
62  T 1.3.9.11; 1.3.10.3-4; 1.3.10.7; SBN 112; 119-20; 122.
63  Resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect.
64  Kristina Blennow, Johannes Persson, Margarida Tome, and Marc Hanewinkel. “Climate change: 
believing and seeing implies adapting.” PloS one 7, no. 11 (2012): e50182.
65  T 1.3.7.7; 1.3.9.1, 11; 1.3.10.3-5, 7; 1.3.14.16; 2.3.3.6-7; 2.3.9.1; SBN 628-9; 106-7; 112; 119-21; 122; 
163; 415-7; 438
66  David P. McCabe and Alan D. Castel. “Seeing is believing: The effect of brain images on judgments 
of scientific reasoning.” Cognition 107, no. 1 (2008): 343-352.
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ages67 more convincing than those with charts or diagrams.68 With the presentation 
of neural images rather than being cognitively tasked with imagining the data based 
on charts and diagrams, the impression has the potential to be more strong and viva-
cious; as brain images are more readily consumable information that are also easily 
available, they may enliven ideas, making them more readily assented to.69 The im-
ages can be seen as more simple, as brain images “look” like what one expects when 
reading information about brain activity and, as such, it could be argued this antici-
pation primes the reader with a more lively and forceful impression.70 
While investigating delusions and perceptions, it was again found that one forms be-
liefs on probability judgments.71 Observed instances of being incorrect72 cause us to 
adjust probability models and alter beliefs and predictive judgments.73 Interpreta-
tions were found to be rooted in previous experiences and observations, the employ-
ment of which re-enliven impressions with the force and vivacity of what is perceived 
to be verifying information;74 perceptual instability led to the development of unclear 
67  Presented as auxiliary information. 
68  When tested again, trial results showed that, even when compared to trials using topographical 
maps deemed as visually stimulating, brain imaging was still found to be more convincing. It was 
hypothesized by the researchers that these images are influential because they are a physical 
representation of abstract cognitive processes which is, in turn, easier for the participants to process.
69  T 1.3.8.2; 1.3.9.2; 1.3.10.8; 1.3.14.17; 1.3.14.19; SBN 98-9; 107; 122-3; 163-4; 164.
It is also noteworthy that with brain images there is less to infer on one’s own than when referencing 
a diagram or chart that contains just as much scientifically accurate information. It could be argued 
that seeing the imagery regarding neuroscience is more compelling than a bar graph or chart (or 
even a visually stimulating topographical map) as it is more strongly associated with and a more 
enlivening representation regarding cognitive phenomenon, and therefore is more likely to lead to 
assent to scientific arguments regarding neuroscience than the most accurate charts or diagrams.
70  T 1.3.7.5; 1.3.8.2; 1.3.14.16; SBN 96; 98-9; 163.
This readiness to assent can also be recognized as compelling based on previous experiences with 
depictions cognitive imagery in popular culture (news, media, forensic style programming, etc.) and 
enliven ideas based on expectations and similarity (T 1.1.4.1-.7; SBN 10-3). 
71  Katharina Schmack, Ana Gòmez-Carrillo de Castro, Marcus Rothkirch, Maria Sekutowicz, Hannes 
Rössler, John-Dylan Haynes, Andreas Heinz, Predrag Petrovic, and Philipp Sterzer. “Delusions and 
the role of beliefs in perceptual inference.” Journal of Neuroscience 33, no. 34 (2013): 13701-13712.
72  Impressions that are lively and forceful enough to get one’s attention.
73  T 1.3.5.7; 1.3.7.5; 1.3.8.2; 1.3.14.16; SBN 86; 96; 98-9; 163.
74  T 1.3.14.15-16; SBN 162-3.
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beliefs about reality in otherwise cognitively healthy individuals.75 When presented 
with ambiguous stimuli, participants were unable to make accurate judgments or 
form accurate beliefs. This indicates, again, that we learn from observation and that 
beliefs and judgments are based on our impressions; the clarity of said impressions 
leads to either a correct or incorrect belief.76 When the impressions appear inconclu-
sive or unstable, we default to established knowledge of similar situations.77 Further 
research examined how erroneous judgments can result in biased expectations of 
future outcomes and impressions.78 It was found that we tend to bias expectations 
of new impressions in a way that integrates them with familiar experiences. This im-
plies that past impressions weigh on what is noticed in future impressions, biasing us 
against contrary experiences.79
Additional support for the importance of observation and judgments based on prior 
experiences in forming beliefs as well as the importance of emotions in determining 
actions was present.80 Researchers found that individuals are often motivated by he-
donic impulses towards pleasure and away from pain.81 A lively and forceful impres-
sions can be used ‘within trial’82 to disambiguate information and prior experiences, 
as well as attention to context.83 Testing showed that individuals are more likely to 
be motivated to action in tasks perceived as pleasurable; they also tended to avoid 
75  T 1.3.10.9; 3.1.1.15; SBN 123, 461; EHU 2.7, 8.14-15; SBN 20; 88-9.
76  Or at times delusional beliefs.
77  T 1.3.12.11-13, 1.3.14.15-16; 1.3.14.19; SBN 134-5; 162-3; 164.
78  Philipp Sterzer, Chris Frith, and Predrag Petrovic. “Believing is seeing: expectations alter visual 
awareness.” Current Biology 18, no. 16 (2008): R697-R698; T 1.3.9.17; 1.3.12.13, 20; 1.3.14.15-16; 
1.3.14.19; SBN 116; 135; 154-5; 162-3; 164.
79  T 1.3.12.7; 1.3.12.12-13; SBN 133; 135.
80  Katia M. Harlé, Pradeep Shenoy, and Martin P. Paulus. “The influence of emotions on cognitive 
control: feelings and beliefs—where do they meet?” Frontiers in human neuroscience 7 (2013): 1-16.
These results indicated that one draws from past experience when making probability judgments.
81  Harlé, Shenoy, and Paulus, “The influence of emotions”.
82  This can also be understood as experience ‘impression by impression’, or ‘experience by 
experience’. 
83  Harlé, Shenoy, and Paulus, “The influence of emotions”.
Context, denoted as flanker stimuli, is definable as situational circumstances or the environment. 
Flanker stimuli is posited to either support or contribute to the correct a belief.
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painful conditions quickly.84 If an individual has an appetite for something, the in-
dividual considered that judgment to have a lower cost than it may actually have;85 
thus, evidence determined that if we have a passionate desire for something, we are 
motivated to action in a way that may go against rational judgment.86 It was also 
found that emotions moderate and buffer the interpretation of new impressions and 
physiological processes: if we are sad, good things seem less so and our pain toler-
ance decreased; if we experience positive emotions, those buffer the impact of nega-
tive experiences and our pain tolerance increases.87 This work provides quantifiable 
evidence for the importance of force, vivacity, and the overall moderation of actions 
by passions.88
It has been established that when making judgments involving desires or wants, we 
often are willing to overlook risks and reduce judgments of harm; we can be motivat-
ed by desire to go against reason and evidence.89 In some instances, when presented 
evidence that runs counter our beliefs, we may reject it and double down on our 
established belief;90 recent research has found evidence of a relationship between 
the experience of negative epistemic emotions and the presentation of disconfirma-
tory evidence.91 Results showed that when participants were presented text refuting 
something they regarded as an integral part of their self-concept, it led to feelings 
of confusion, frustration, and anxiety.92 Contemporary research has also found that 
when we are confronted with an interaction or piece of evidence that runs against 
84  T 1.3.9.1; 1.3.12.11-13; 1.3.14.16; 2.3.3.6-7; 3.1.1.12; SBN 106-7; 134-5; 163; 415-7; 459-60.
85  T 2.3.3.3; 2.3.3.6-7; 2.3.9.1-2; 3.1.1.12; SBN 414; 415-7; 438.
86  T 2.3.3.6-7; SBN 415-7.
87  This lends further evidence that one is emotionally motivated to action based on motivation 
towards pleasure and away from pain, as well as the proposition that judgment is, overall, an 
exercise in passion.
88  T 2.3.3.4-6; SBN 414-16.
89  Harlé, Shenoy, and Paulus, “The influence of emotions”.
90  Gregory J. Trevors, Krista R. Muis, Reinhard Pekrun, Gale M. Sinatra, and Philip H. Winne. 
“Identity and epistemic emotions during knowledge revision: A potential account for the backfire 
effect.” Discourse Processes 53, no. 5-6 (2016): 339-370.
This phenomenon has been dubbed the Backfire Effect. 
91  Trevors, Muis, Pekrun, Sinatra, and Winne, “Identity and epistemic emotions during knowledge 
revision.” 
92  T 2.3.2.7; SBN 411-12.
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prior experiences, the delivery of the evidence is important.93 We are more receptive 
to disconfirmatory evidence when it is presented in a deliberative manner.94 Further, 
the simple presentation of evidence and reason does not motivate us to correct a be-
lief—it is the pairing of evidence with certain social interactions and emotional con-
texts that was found to be effective.95
Hume’s proposition that the mechanism of sympathy as natural or reflexive is also 
reflected in recent research.96 The communicability of emotions and their role in in-
formation processing has found support. Not only do results indicate that we utilizes 
observable emotional expressions when forming beliefs,97 but that these observ-
able emotions are used as cues for developing our own attitudes and beliefs.98 In 
line with Hume’s mechanism of sympathy,99 research indicates that this emotional 
informational and sympathetic processing was present regardless of the commu-
nication medium, be it written, pictorial, non-verbal, or audibly.100 The importance 
of passions and sympathy in correcting beliefs was also reflected in work regarding 
93  T 2.3.6.7; 3.2.2.9; SBN 426-7; 489.
94  Christa S.C. Asterhan and Miriam Babichenko. “The social dimension of learning through 
argumentation: Effects of human presence and discourse style.” Journal of Educational 
Psychology 107, no. 3 (2015): 740-755.
It is of note that this deliberation allows for the extension of sympathy via social interaction, as 
opposed to argumentative approaches which do not. 
95  Asterhan and Babichenko, “The social dimension of learning through argumentation”.
96  Gerben A. Van Kleef., Helma van den Berg, and Marc W. Heerdink. “The persuasive power of 
emotions: Effects of emotional expressions on attitude formation and change.” Journal of Applied 
Psychology 100, no. 4 (2015): 1124-1142.
97  T 2.1.11.1-4; 3.3.3.2; SBN 316-18; 602-3.
98  T 1.3.12.12.-13; 1.3.12.19; 1.4.1.11; SBN 135; 137-8; 185-6.
99  T 2.1.11.1-2; 2.1.11.7-8; 2.3.6.7-8; SBN 316-17; 319-20; 426-27.
100  Participants were found to be moved to sympathy with emotional expression through written 
words, pictures of facial expressions, as well as film clips with vocal and facial expressions of 
fictitious persons, and when viewing emoticons/emojis.  
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belief and anti-vaccination attitudes.101 Individuals assigned to an intervention with 
emotionally appealing materials were more likely to revise their belief. 
Similarly, while researching prejudicial belief and transphobia, it was found that par-
ticipants more readily corrected a belief in conditions involving perspective taking.102 
Those assigned to the emotionally compelling condition were asked to consider a 
time where they felt they had been judged negatively.103 This resulted in individu-
als reporting less transphobia post-intervention.104 As participants were approached 
through their passions sympathetically rather than by their reason alone, these re-
sults lend further support to a hypothesis that passions motivate beliefs and, subse-
quently, actions.105 
More support for the importance of sympathy and socializing can be derived from 
work with the Contact Hypothesis.106 A recent meta-analysis concluded that expo-
101  Zachary Horne, Derek Powell, John E. Hummel, and Keith J. Holyoak. “Countering antivaccination 
attitudes.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112, no. 33 (2015): 10321-10324.
Participants were assigned to either the disease risk perspective, autism correction condition, 
or control group. Those in the emotionally compelling condition received an information packet 
containing a paragraph written from the perspective of a mother whose child contracted measles, a 
picture of a child with measles, a child with mumps, and an infant with rubella, as well as three short 
warning about the importance of vaccinating children. Those in the autism correction condition 
received refutational evidence. Finally, individuals in the control group received unrelated reading 
materials.
102  David Broockman and Joshua Kalla. “Durably reducing transphobia: A field experiment on door-
to-door canvassing.” Science 352, no. 6282 (2016): 220-224.
Researchers employed a canvassing technique with interviewers going to the houses of the selected 
participants for brief face-to-face encounters The participant pool was selected using an ongoing 
online survey gauging belief and attitudes. This survey allowed the researchers to establish an 
individual’s baseline attitudes prior to the intervention and following it longitudinally.
103  Perspective taking was coupled with active consideration of the target group and issues they 
faced (in this instance, transgendered individuals).
104  Reports were taken up to six months later and remained consistently decreased. 
105  Passions, in conjunction with sympathy.
106  Gordon Allport. The Nature of Prejudice (New York: Addison, 1954); T 1.3.13.9; 2.1.11.8; 2.3.6.7-8; 
SBN 147-8; 319-20; 426-7.
The Contact Hypothesis is a contemporary psychological model that stresses the importance of 
exposure and experience in revising prejudicial beliefs and increasing tolerance between groups
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sure and contact generally reduces prejudice and intolerance.107 In positive interac-
tions, new experiences generalize and reduce previous biases. Not only does this 
indicate that exposure allows us to extend sympathy to individuals judged in haste, 
but it also allows an opportunity to realize that our previous experienced was not 
representative,108 correcting an unphilosophical probability to be more in line with 
proper belief. The Contact Hypothesis has found continued support with work inves-
tigating the practice of social-distancing from HIV-positive individuals in Africa.109 It 
was concluded that increasing opportunities for meaningful interaction was a viable 
means of countering discrimination.110 This new experiences allowed participants to 
extend sympathy to HIV-positive individuals in their community; their enlivened pas-
sions and sympathy resulted in  increased tolerance and a reassessment of discrimi-
natory beliefs. This process was contingent on arousing the passions of participants. 
It also indicated that uncertain feelings contributed to intergroup anxieties.111 Evi-
dence supported the hypothesis that attending to this uncertainty with further ex-
posure112 will ameliorate anxiety and fear that stems from this uncertainty.113 As 
increased contact with individuals runs contrary to previous experiences reduces 
negative feelings and anxiety,114 it follows that one’s feelings regarding the contact 
107  Thomas F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp. “A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact 
theory.” Journal of personality and social psychology 90, no. 5 (2006): 751-783.
It was initially hypothesized that in order for the interaction to be effective, individuals needed be of 
an equal status, have a common goal that necessitated intergroup cooperation, as well as support of 
the law or popular custom. This was found to be unnecessary.
108  T 1.3.12.12-13; 1.3.13.9; SBN 135;147-8.
109  Brian T. Chan and Alexander C. Tsai. “Personal contact with HIV-positive persons is associated 
with reduced HIV-related stigma: cross-sectional analysis of general population surveys from 26 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa.” Journal of the International AIDS Society 20, no. 1 (2017): 1-8.
Social-distancing is the act of intentionally disassociating oneself from another individual or group. 
Their work indicated that contact with HIV-positive individuals resulted in a reduced desire for 
social-distance in the future.
110  This, again, supports Hume’s postulations regarding unphilosophical probabilities, the 
importance of experience, as well as the extension of sympathy.
111  Chan and Tsai. “Personal contact with HIV-positive persons”.
112  As Hume would suggest, giving individuals greater experience and more opportunities to 
socialize.
113  T 2.3.9.20-31; SBN 444-8.
114  Pettigrew and Tropp. “A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory”.
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and the new experience115 take the lead in motivating the correction of beliefs. These 
positive experiences that predicate a reduction of uncertainty and anxiety in judg-
ments116 move an individual with more pleasant and sympathetic impressions and 
ideas that further generalize as a restraint in judgments in future situations.117 The 
combination of experience, sympathy, and the socialization breaks one’s prior men-
tal-habits or customs of belief,118 allowing for a new judgment based on new experi-
ences and passions via the mechanism of sympathy.
Conclusion
The importance of passions,119 understanding through sympathy120 granted by expe-
rience, as well as the role of socializing in tempering judgments and their contribu-
tions to the correction of beliefs cannot be overlooked. Hume positions socializing as 
a key component necessary for the correction of belief and tempering of future judg-
ment.121 Not only is social experience and extension of sympathy necessary for one 
to revise a belief in the Treatise, but contemporary work reaffirms these connections. 
It was also found that the presentation and interpretation of evidence is an integral 
component in the process one must undergo to correct a judgment. Passion must be 
aroused; simply appealing to rational capacities does not motivate the correction of 
a belief.122 The importance Hume placed on individual perception coupled with his 
empirical philosophical methodology provides a more nuanced and tolerant frame-
work sympathetic to cultural differences. With the initial hypothesis supported, it is 
possible to utilize a contemporary account of Hume’s theory of belief in reference to 
current social problems. 
115  Rather than strictly reasoning or previously formed probability judgments.
116  Pettigrew and Tropp, “A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory”; T 2.3.9.19; SBN 443-444.
117  Pettigrew and Tropp,; T 2.3.6.7-8; 3.1.2.11; SBN 426-7; 475-6.
118  T 2.1.11.7-8; 2.3.6.7-8; SBN 318-20; 426-7.
119  Horne, Powell, Hummel, and Holyoak, “Countering antivaccination attitudes”; Van Kleef, van den 
Berg, and Heerdink, “The persuasive power of emotions.”
120  Allport, The Nature of Prejudice; Broockman and Kalla, “Durably reducing transphobia”; Chan and 
Tsai. “Personal contact with HIV-positive persons”; Pettigrew and Tropp, “A meta-analytic test of 
intergroup contact theory”.
121  T 1.4.1.11; 3.1.1.15; SBN 185-6; 461.
122  Horne, Powell, Hummel, and Holyoak, “Countering antivaccination attitudes”; Van Kleef, van den 
Berg, and Heerdink, “The persuasive power of emotions”; T 2.3.3.2; SBN 413-14.
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